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Abstract— Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial 
of Service (DDoS) attacks have emerged as a popular means 
of causing collection particular overhaul disruptions, often 
for total periods of instance. The relative ease and low costs 
of initiation such attacks, supplemented by the present 
insufficient sate of any feasible defense method, have made 
them one of the top threats to the Internet centre of 
population nowadays. Since the rising attractiveness of web-
based applications has led to quite a lot of significant services 
being provided more than the Internet, it is very important to 
monitor the network transfer so as to stop hateful attackers 
from depleting the assets of the network and denying services 
to rightful users. The most important drawbacks of the 
presently existing defense mechanisms and propose a new-
fangled mechanism for defending a web-server against a 
DDoS attack. In the proposed mechanism, incoming traffic to 
the server is always monitored and some irregular rise in the 
inbound traffic is without delay detected. The detection 
algorithm is based on a statistical analysis of the inbound 
traffic on the server and a robust suggestion testing 
structure. While the detection procedure is on, the sessions 
from the rightful sources are not disrupted and the load on 
the server is restored to the usual level by overcrowding the 
traffic from the attacking sources. The accurate modules 
employ multifaceted detection logic and hence involve 
additional overhead for their execution. On the other hand, 
they have very huge detection accuracy. Simulations 
approved on the proposed mechanism have produced results 
that show efficiency of the proposed defense mechanism 
against DDoS attacks. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 A denial of service (DoS) attack is defined as an 
unambiguous effort by a horrible user to get through the 
capital of a server or a network, thereby preventing 
rightful users from availing the services provided by the 
system. The most ordinary DoS attacks typically engage 
flooding with a huge volume of travel and overwhelming 
network resources such as bandwidth, buffer space at the 
routers, CPU time and revival cycles of the end server. A 
small number of the common DoS attacks are SYN 
flooding, UDP flooding, DNS based flooding, ICMP 
directed broadcast, Ping flood attack, IP fragmentation, 
and CGI attacks [1]. Based on the number of violent 
equipment deployed to perform the attack, DoS attacks are 
classified into two broad categories: (i) The single intruder 
consume with the maximum possible bandwidth obtain 
from the packets from the one individual users machine or 
(ii) The various frequent attackers are coordinator with the 
same effect from multiple machine with a different 
network. The DDoS attacks identification process is very 
tricky to notice. It is extremely important that suitable 
defense mechanism should be in place to notice such 
attacks as speedily as possible. 
 
In this paper, a robust method is proposed to care for a 
web server from DDoS attack utilizing some easily 
reachable information in the server. Through the whole 
system is not promise to detect the DDoS attack fully and 
also server within short duration time server quickly 
shutdown appears, on the same time normal network 
service cannot possible. The new efficient detection 
algorithm is used to find the flexible solution for the 
DDoS Attacks. The efficient detection algorithm is 
classified different modules. Find out the DDoS attack is 
very quickly with simple statistical analysis of the network 
traffic and also very less computational memory overhead 
on the server. The development of the algorithm is based 
on the legitimate users are allowed as well as attackers are 
identified and also deleted. This aspect of behaviour DDoS 
attacks is not taken into account in numerous of the 
commercial solutions [3].   
 
II. DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE (DDOS) ATTACK  
There are two most significant types of DDoS attacks 
[4]. The attacks of the first type’s attempt to get through 
the resources of the injured party host. In general the 
victim is a web server or proxy connected to the Internet. 
When the traffic load becomes enormously eminent, the 
victim host starts dropping packets both from the authentic 
users and attack sources. The victim also sends message to 
all the sources to trim down their sending rates. The 
authentic sources slowly downwards their rates while the 
attack sources still maintain or increase their sending rates. 
Eventually, the victim host’s resources, such as CPU 
cycles and memory space get exhausted and the victim is 
unable to service its genuine clients. The attacks of the 
second type target network bandwidth. If the malicious 
traffics in the network are able to dominate the 
communication links, then traffics from the genuine 
sources are affected. The effects of bandwidth DDoS 
attacks are usually more severe than the resource 
consumption attacks. In this section, some classic 
bandwidth attacks are discussed. 
 
The SYN flood attack occur means server needs to 
provide the huge memory data structure for authentication 
of incoming SYN packets. During SYN flood attacks, the 
attacker sends more number of SYN packets with source 
addresses. In the request response process time, when the 
server sends the request information into the memory 
stack, it will wait for the verification from the client that 
sends the request. Thus the request is waiting to be 
established, it will stay in the memory stack. Since the 
source addresses used in SYN flood attacks may be 
spurious, the server will not receive confirmation packets 
for requests created by the SYN flood attack. Each half-
open connection will stay on the memory stack in 
anticipation of it times out. This causes the memory stack 
getting occupied. Furthermore, including genuine requests 
can be processed and the services of the system are 
disabled. SYN floods remain one of the most powerful 
flooding methods. 
 
The smurf attack is a type of ICMP flood, where 
attackers use ICMP echo request packets directed to IP 
broadcast addresses from remote locations to generate 
denial of service attacks. There are three entities in these 
attacks: the attacker, the intermediary, and the victim. 
First, the attacker sends one ICMP echo request packet to 
the network broadcast address and the request is 
forwarded to all the hosts within the intermediary network. 
Second, all of the hosts within the intermediary network 
send the ICMP echo replies to flood the victim. Solutions 
to the smurf attack include disabling the IP-directed 
broadcast service at the intermediary network. Nowadays, 
smurf attacks are quite rare in the Internet since defending 
against such attacks are not difficult. 
 
An HHTP flood refers to an attack that bombards web 
servers with HTTP requests. HTTP flood is a common 
feature in most botnet software. To send an HTTP request, 
a valid TCP connection has to be established, which 
requires a genuine IP address. Attackers can achieve this 
by using a bot’s IP address. Moreover, attackers can craft 
the HTTP requests in different ways in order to either 
maximize the attack power or avoid detection. For 
example, an attacker can instruct the botnet to send HTTP 
requests to download a large file from the target. The 
target then has to read the file from the hard disk, store it 
in memory, load it into packets and then send the packets 
back to the botnet. Hence, a simple HTTP request can 
incur significant resource consumption in the CPU, 
memory, input/output devices, and outbound Internet link. 
 
Another important DDoS attack is the SIP flood attack. 
A widely supported open standard for call setup in the 
voice over IP (VoIP) is the session initiation protocol 
(SIP) [5]. Generally, SIP proxy servers require public 
Internet access in order to accept call setup requests from 
any VoIP client. Moreover, to achieve scalability, SIP is 
typically implemented on top of UDP in order to be 
stateless. In one attack scenario, the attacker can flood the 
SIP proxy with many SIP INVITE packets that have 
spoofed source IP addresses [6]. To avoid any anti-
spoofing mechanisms, the attackers can also launch the 
flood from a botnet using non-spoofed source IP 
addresses. There are two categories of victims in this 
attack scenario. The first types of victims are the SIP 
proxy servers. Not only will their server resources be 
depleted by processing the SIP INVITE packets, but their 
network capacity will also be consumed by the SIP 
INVITE flood. In either case, the SIP proxy server will be 
unable to provide VoIP service. The second types of 
victims are the call receivers. They will be overwhelmed 
by the forged VoIP calls, and will become nearly 
impossible to reach by the genuine callers. 
 
III. RELATED WORK  
 
Protection against DoS and DDoS attacks extremely 
depends on the model of the network and the type of 
attack. Several mechanisms have been proposed to solve 
the problem. However, most of them have weakness and 
fail under positive scenarios. In this section, some of the 
existing defense mechanisms against DoS and DDoS 
attacks are discussed briefly. 
 
Protocol reordering and Protocol enhancement methods 
make security protocols more robust and less susceptible 
to resource consumption attacks [11][12]. 
 
Network ingress filtering is a mechanism proposed to 
prevent attacks that use spoofed basis addresses [13]. This 
involves configuring the routers to drop packets that have 
illegitimate source IP addresses. One of the serious pitfalls 
of this way is its inability to curtail a flood attack that 
originates with a spoofed IP address from within the 
network. 
 
ICMP traceback messages are useful to recognize the 
path taken by packets through the Internet [14]. This 
requires a router to use a very low chance with which 
traceback messages are sent along with the traffic. Hence, 
with adequately large number of messages, it is possible to 
conclude the route taken by the traffic during an attack. 
This enables localization of the aggressive host. 
 
An approach to conquer the problems connected with 
ascertaining the validity of IP addresses in ingress filtering 
is to use the routing in sequence instead of just the source 
address. IP traceback proposes a reliable way to perform 
hop by hop tracing of a packet to the attacking source from 
where it originated [15][16]. However, this requires 
coordinated effort from all the routers in the network along 
with the path from the victim to the attacker, and 
examination of the packet logs. 
 
Deterministic packet marking (DPM) is another device 
to detect DoS attacks [17]. It relies on routing information 
inscribed in the packet header by the routers as the packet 
traverses the network. This come near leads to an increase 
in the size of the IP packet header as the size of IP header 
increases linearly with the number of hops traversed. The 
consequential variable header size increases the 
complexity of processing. 
 
Probabilistic packet marking (PPM) for IP traceback is 
a method that attempts to get better DPM [18]. It 
eliminates IP address spoofing by allowing each router to 
probabilistically inscribe local path information onto a 
packet that traverses it [17]. This enables a victim host to 
localize the attacking source while retaining fixed sized 
packet headers. The mechanism is dependent on route 
stability between the attacker and the victim to localize the 
attacker. A similar mechanism known as route-based 
packet filtering has been proposed in [19], which uses the 
source and destination addresses on a packet header to 
ascertain the strength of the route. 
 
Yaar et al. have proposed an approach, called path 
identifier (Pi), in which a trail fingerprint is embedded in 
each packet, enabling a victim to identify packets 
traversing the same paths through the Internet on a per 
packet basis, regardless of source IP address spoofing 
[20]. Pi allows the victim to take a practical role in 
defending against a DDoS attack by using the Pi mark to 
filter out attack packets. 
 
Pushback approaches have been proposed to extract 
attack signatures by rate-limiting the doubtful traffic 
destined to a congested link [21][22]. Since the DDoS 
flooding travel does not follow the end-to-end flow control 
protocol in the path, it is possible to find the congestion 
signature using the packet drop statistics. Pushback 
differentiates attacking travel from rightful travel by 
monitoring whether the suspicious travel obeys the end-to-
end congestion control. 
 
Gil et al. have proposed a scheme named MULTOPS 
[23] in which routers notice bandwidth attacks using a 
heuristic based on packet sending rates. Under non-attack 
circumstances, the packet flow rate in the way over the 
Internet is directly proportional to the packet flow rate in 
the differing direction. As soon as this condition is 
violated, an attack is supposed to have occurred. However, 
efficiency of MULTOPS degrades with randomized IP 
source addresses. 
 
Mirkovic et al. have proposed a scheme named D-
WARD that performs statistical traffic profiling at the 
edge of the networks to notice new types of DDoS attacks 
[24]. By monitoring the nominal per-destination type 
traffic arrival and departure rates of TCP, UDP, ICMP 
packets, and on observing any irregular asymmetric 
behavior of the two-way traffic at the edge router 
connecting to a stub-network, D-WARD aims at stopping 
DDoS attacks near their sources. 
 
Zou et al. have presented an adaptive defense scheme 
that adjusts its configurations according to the network 
conditions and attack severity in order to minimize the 
joint cost introduced by false positives (wrongly identify 
normal attack as an attack) and fake negatives (wrongly 
identify attack traffic as normal) [25]. 
 
Client side puzzle and other pricing algorithms 
[26][27][28] are efficient tools to make protocols less 
vulnerable to depletion attacks of processing power. 
However, in case of disseminated attacks their 
effectiveness is debatable. 
 
IV. ALGORITHMS IN THE INTERFACE MODULE 
 
In this DDOS detection and protection system two 
types of algorithm, 
 Special flow Monitoring Algorithm 
 IP Traceback Algorithm 
 
The special flow monitoring algorithm is running 
at the non-attack period, accumulating information 
from normal network flows, and progressing the 
mean and the standard variation of flows. The 
progressing suspends when a DDoS attack is 
ongoing. Once a DDoS attack has been confirmed 
by any of the existing DDoS detection algorithms, 
then the victim starts the IP traceback algorithm. 
This continuously monitoring the http request from 
the internet. When the request is coming, it 
identifies the IP address and stored in cache and 
starts counting the request from the same IP address 
and also maintains the timer. 
 
 Initiate the local parameter X,U,D. 
U={ } be set of upstream  routers, D={ } be set 
a destination address of the packet and the victim is 
V. 
The attack flow as, =< ,i=1,2,..n. That’s like 
a data flow as ,……  
For i=1 to n 
{ 
Calculate H(F\ ) 
If  H(F\ )>   
Upstream  router of  to set A 
else break; 
The Special flow Monitoring Algorithm 
 
 The attack packets are reaching a current 
router as follow a1; a2; . . .; ak. 
 Attack packet rates are k. 
 Set count as each flow ,……. . 
 And the p represent   distribution rate of packets. 
          
 
 Identify the flows ,……  
 The entropy variation formula is, 
 
 
          
end if; 
end for; 
} 
 
More than 20 requests within one second from same IP 
address is considered as DDOS attack. Then the IP address 
is blocked for certain time periods prevention that means 
the suspicious IP address is blocked for certain time 
periods. That’s like a monitoring process are very effective 
to monitoring the network and this monitoring is used to 
find out the attacker easily. The monitoring process is used 
to pushback when the attack is occurring. The traceback 
process is find out the attacker from the network when the 
attack traffic is present in the network 
 
In the IP traceback algorithm is installed at routers. It is 
initiated by the victim, and at the upstream routers, it is 
triggered by the IP traceback requests from the victim or 
the downstream routers which are on the attack path. The 
proposed algorithms are independent from the current 
routing software, they can work as independent modules at 
routers. As a result, we do not need to change the current 
routing software. 
 
V. SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS 
 
The simulation is implemented in Network Simulator 
2.31[19], a simulator for wired networks. The simulation 
parameters are provided in Table 1. We implement the 
random waypoint movement model for the simulation, in 
which a node starts at a random position, waits for the 
pause time, and then moves to another random position 
with a velocity chosen 35 m/s. A packet size of 512 bytes 
and a transmission rate of 4 packets/s,  
Performance Metrics: In our simulations utilize several 
performance metrics to compare the proposed web server 
model with the existing one [20]. The following metrics 
were measured for the comparison were  
a) Throughput: Number of packets sends in per unit of 
time.  
b) Packet delivery fraction (PDF): The ratio between the 
numbers of packets sends by source nodes to the number 
of packets correctly received by the corresponding 
destination nodes.  
c) End to End delay: - Measure as the average end to end 
latency of data packets.  
d) Normalized routing load: Measured as the number of 
routing packets transmitted for each data packet delivered 
at the destination.  
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1 Simulation Parameters for Case Study 
 
Number of nodes  13  
Dimension of simulated 
area  
800×600  
Simulation time (sec)  35  
Radio range  250m  
Traffic type  CBR, 3pkts/s  
Packet size (bytes)  512  
Number of traffic 
connections  
TCP/UDP  
Maximum Speed (m/s)  35  
Node movement  random  
Types of attack  DDOS  
 
Poisson model of travel arrival is chosen as it is 
particularly suitable for dealing with some Internet 
protocols if its parameters are set appropriately. Internet 
control message protocol (ICMP), network time protocol 
(NTP) and domain name service (DNS) clients post many 
small packets of constant size with uniformly distributed 
inter-packet arrival time. These protocols resemble very 
intimately to the assumptions that have been made in the 
simulation. This makes the results in simulation realistic. 
Since in practical scenarios, the number of genuine clients 
that connect to a server may also vary over a broad range, 
the following cases are considered: 
 
Case 1: For a little corporate server, the number of legal 
clients is low, say N(t) = 5. presumptuous that the capacity 
of the server is high, the average load on the server will be 
less. consequently, the number of attacking hosts should 
be high, say A(t) = 40. Hence, in this scenario, for an 
effective attack we must have N(t) << A(t). 
 
Case 2: For a server of medium size, it may be supposed 
that N(t) = 50 and a successful attacker can launch his/her 
attack from a fewer number of hosts. Thus it may be 
assumed that A(t) = 50 in this case. As the number of 
officially permitted clients and the number of attacking 
sources are of comparable size, it is easier for the attacker 
to hide his/her attack in this case. Therefore, in this 
situation, N(t) _ A(t). 
 
Case 3: For a worldwide portal server, there can be a 
very large number of legal clients, say N(t) = 10000. In 
this circumstances, it is not possible for that attacker to 
easily estimate the required number of attacking hosts. In 
this case, it is assumed that the attacker chooses a 
reasonably high value of A(t), say A(t) = 5000, and opts for 
a very high attacking rate: _a = _n*10. Therefore, in this 
case: N(t) > A(t). 
 
In the first simulation, a huge number of hosts are taken 
to test the efficiency of the proposed mechanism on a large 
system. The simulation parameters are listed in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Simulation parameters for Simulation I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3 Overall summaries of Results in all Cases 
 
 
According to act analysis in normal case, in attack case we 
monitor that DDOS attack definitely pretentious the 
network and our scheme is successfully defence the 
network and also provides the safety against them. In case 
of attack we scrutinize that the routing load is very high 
because attacker node are constantly transmit the routing 
packets to their neighboured and every node in network 
are reply to attacker node by that heavy congestion is 
occur. Packet delivery fraction and end to end delay are 
also goes near to the ground, which shows that packets are 
not deliver exactly and number of dropped data is goes 
high approximately twice to the usual condition. 
 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
The steady progress of DDoS attacks as a means for 
achieving political, economic and commercial gains, and 
the relative ease, low costs, and limited responsibility in 
launching such attacks, have rendered them one of the top 
pressure to today’s Internet services. Although a diversity 
of independent DDoS attack prevention, mitigation, and 
traceback techniques have been proposed by researchers 
over the last decades, their relative uptake has been 
minimal at beast, due to the be short of a robust, fool-
proof, and universal DDoS attack defense mechanism. In 
this paper, a mechanism is presented for detection and 
anticipation of DDoS attacks on a web server while the 
proposed mechanism does not affect the traffic from 
genuine clients, it effectively blocks traffic from the attack 
sources with a very low false positive rate and high 
detection accuracy. The simulation results demonstrate the 
efficiency of the proposed mechanism. Development of an 
analytical framework for finding an optimum value of the 
traffic analysis window (ws) and design of a heuristic for 
faster attack discovery with more accuracy are the two 
areas in which future research work will be approved out. 
 
REFERENCES  
 
[1] Ramanathan, A.: WesDes: A Tool for Distributed Denial of 
Service Attack Detection. Thesis at Texas A&M University, 
August 2002. 
[2] Forristal, J.: Fireproofing against DoS Attacks. URL: 
http://www.networkcomputing.com/1225/1225f3.html, 
Network Computing. 
[3]  Sen, J.: A Novel Mechanism for Detection of Distributed 
Denial of Service Attacks. In Proceedings of the 1st 
International Conference on Computer Science and 
Information Technology (CCSIT 2011), Bangalore, India. 
pp. 247 – 257, January 2 – 4, 2011. 
[4]  Peng, T., Leckie, C., Ramamohanarao, K.: Survey of 
Network-Based Defense Mechanisms Countering the DoS 
and DDoS Problems. ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. 39, 
No. 1, April 2007. 
[5]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., 
Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., Schooler, E.: SIP: 
Session Initiation Protocol, RFC 3261, Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF). 2002. 
[6]  Chen, E.Y.: Detecting DoS Attacks on SIP Systems. In: 
Proceedings of the 1st IEEE Workshop on VoIP 
Management and Security, pp 53 – 58. 
[7]  Paxson, V.: An Analysis of Using Reflectors for 
Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks. ACM Computing 
Communication Review, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 38 -47, 2001. 
[8]  Mockapetris, P.: Domain Names – Implementation and 
Specification. RFC 1035, Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF). URL: http://www.ietf.org. 
[9]  Scalzo, F.: Recent DNS Reflector Attacks. Verisign. URL: 
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0606/pdf/frank-scalzo.pdf. 
[10] The Measurement Factory DNS Survey. URL: 
http://dns.measurement-factory.com/surveys/sum1.html. 
[11]  Matsure, K., Imai, H.: Protection of Authenticated Key-
Agreement Protocol against a Denial-of- Service Attack. In 
Proceedings of 1998 International Symposium on 
Information Theory and its Applications ISITA’98), pp. 466 
– 470, Oct. 1998. 
Parameter  
 
Value 
Number of legal 
clients (N(t)) 
12000 
Number of attacking 
hosts (A(t)) 
6000 
Mean normal traffic 
rate (_n) 
0.4 
Mean attack traffic 
rate (_a) 
0.5 
Parameter Normal Case  Attack Case  
SEND 928 633 
RECEIVE 924 582 
ROUTING 
PACKETS 
169 229882 
PACKET 
DELIVRY 
FRACTION 
95.1 89.43 
THROUGHPUT 
 
107 58 
NORMAL 
ROUTING 
LOAD 
0.12 456.19 
AVERAGE END 
TO END 
DELAY 
852.04 751.64 
No. Of dropped 
data(packets) 
23 51 
No. Of dropped 
data(bytes) 
23852 44556 
[12]  Leiwo, J., Aura, T., Nikandar, P.: Towards Network Denial 
of Service Resistant Protocols. In Proceedings of IFIP SEC 
2000, Beijing, China, pp. 301 – 310, August 2000. 
[13]  Ferguson, P., Senie, D.: Network Ingress Filtering: 
Defending Denial of Service Attack which Employ IP 
Source Address Spoofing. RFC 2827, May 2000. 
[14]  Belovin, S., Leech, M., Taylor, T.: ICMP Traceback 
Messages. Internet draft, URL: http://www.ietf.org/internet-
drafts/draft-ietf-itrace-01.txt, October 2001. 
[15]  Kiran, U., Tupakula, Varadharajan, V.: Analysis of 
Traceback Techniques. In Proceedings of the ACSW,.Cisco 
Systems Inc, “Characterizing and tracing packet floods 
using Cisco routers.” URL: 
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/22.html, January 
2006 
[16] Law, T.K.T., Lui, J.C.S., Yau, D.K.Y.: You Can Run, but 
You Can’t Hide: An Effective Statistical Methodology to 
Trace Back DDoS Attackers. IEEE Transactions on Parallel 
and Distributed Systems, pp. 799-813, September 2005. 
[17]  Burch, H., Cheswick, B.: Tracing Anonymous Packets to 
Their Approximate Source. In Proceedings of the 14th 
Systems Administration Conference, USENIX LISA, pp. 
319-327, December 2000, 
[18]  Park, K., Lee, H.: On the Effectiveness of Probabilistic 
Packet Marking for IP Traceback under Denial of Service 
Attack. In Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM’01, Anchorage, 
pp. 319 – 347, Alaska, 2001, 
[19]  Park, K., Lee, H.: “On the Effectiveness of Route-Based 
Packet Filtering for Distributed DoS Attack Prevention in 
Power-Law Internet. In Proceedings of ACM 
SIGCOMM’01, San Diego, CA, pp. 15 – 26,  August 2001. 
[20]  Yaar, A., Perrig, A., Song, D.: StackPi: New Packet 
Marking and Filtering Mechanisms for DDoS and IP 
Spoofing Defense. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in 
Communications, pp. 1853-1863, October 2006. 
[21] Yau, D.K.Y., Lui, J.C.S., Liang, F.: Defending against 
Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks with Max-Min Fair 
Sever-Centric Router Throttles. In Proceedings of the 10th 
International Workshop on Quality of  ervice, 2002. 
[22] Cai, M., Chen, Y., Kwok, Y.K., Hwang, K.: A Scalable Set-
Union Counting Approach to Pushing Back DDoS Attacks. 
USC GridSec Technical Report TR-2004-21, October 2004. 
[23]  T. M. Gil, “MULTOPS: A data-structure for bandwidth 
attack detection.” MS Thesis, Virjie Universiteit, 
Amsterdam, Netherlands, August 2000. 
[24]  Mirkovic, J., Reiher, P.: D-WARD: A Source-End Defense 
against Flooding Denial-of-Service Attacks. IEEE 
Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, July-
September, 2005. 
[25]  Zou, C.C., Duffield, N., Towsley, D., Gong, W.: Adaptive 
Defense against Various Network Attacks. IEEE Journal on 
Selected Areas of Communication, High-Speed Network 
Security- Architecture, Algorithms, and Implementation, 
October 2006. 
[26]  Dwork, C., Naor, M.: Pricing via Processing or Combating 
Junk Mail. In Proceedings of the Crypto’92: 12th Annual 
International Cryptology Conference, LNCS Springer-
Verlag, Vol 740, pp. 139 – 147, Santa Barbara, CA, August 
1992. 
[27]  Jackobson, M., Jules, H.: Proof of Work and Bread 
Pudding Protocols. In Proceedings of the IFIP TCI and TCII 
Joint Working Conference on Communications and 
Multimedia Security (CMS’99), pp. 258 – 272,  euven, 
Belgium, September 1999, Kluwer. 
[28]  Juels, A., Brainard, J.: Client Puzzles: A Cryptographic 
Countermeasure against Connection Depletion Attacks. In 
Proceedings of the 1999 Network and Distributed System 
Security Symposium (NDSS’99), pp. 151 – 165, San Diego, 
CA, February 1999. 
 
Saravanan Kumarasamy  
received the M.E degree 2008 in computer science 
from Dr.MCET, Anna University, Chennai, India. 
He is currently working as a Lecturer at the 
Faculty of Engineering, Erode Sengunthar 
Engineering College, Erode, Tamilnadu. He has 
published 5 paper in International Journal, 10 
papers in National Conference and 02 papers in 
International Conference..His current research 
interests are information security, computer 
communications and DDoS Attacks. He is 
currently pursuing Ph.D. under Anna University 
of Technology, Coimbatore. 
 
Dr.R.Asokan  
received the Ph.D degree in Information and 
Communication Engineering from Anna 
University, Chennai. He has 25 years of teaching 
experience. At present he is working as Principal at 
Kongunadu College of Engineering and 
Technology, Thottiam, Trichy. He has published 
more than 70 papers in National and International 
Journals and Conferences. He has organized more 
than 20 Seminars, Workshops and Conferences.   
He has delivered around 40 special lectures in various summer / winter 
school/ sponsored programmes. He is the associate editor for Journal of 
selected areas in telecommunication and also Editorial board member 
for five International Journals.  His areas of interest include 
communication networks, network security and image processing.   He 
is an active member in many Professional bodies like IETE, ISTE, CSI, 
ACS etc. 
 
 
